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Litigation of federal black lung claims has been altered by the revisions
to the regulations governing the adjudication of claims.' The procedures and
types of evidence that can be considered have been changed, causing the claims
process to resemble a three-ring circus. Parties are now specifically constrained
to offer limited affirmative evidence, rebuttal evidence, or reply evidence in the
event the opponent's rebuttal evidence tends to undermine the conclusion of a
physician whose medical report was offered in the affirmative or rebuttal case.2
Trying to control all of the action under the three-ring big top is due process.
3
At its core, due process guarantees a meaningful hearing after proper notice
before personal liberties or property are taken, providing equity and fair play.
* Member, Jackson Kelly PLLC Morgantown, West Virginia; adjunct lecturer in Law, West
Virginia University College of Law; BA 1982 University of Cincinnati; J.D. 1985 University of
Cincinnati.
See Regulations Implementing the Federal Coal Mine Health and Safety Act of 1969, as
amended, 65 Fed. Reg. 79,920 (Dec. 20, 2000) (implementing changes to 20 C.F.R. parts 718 and
725).
2 See 20 C.F.R. § 725.414 (2000).
3 Lane Hollow Coal Co. v. Dir., OWCP, 137 F.3d 799, 808 (4th Cir. 1998) ("'Due process' is
a big tent. It covers not only the procedural fundamentals at issue here but also certain substantive
personal liberties and basic rules of justice .... However in their essential character, these fair-
play rules do not resemble the core components of due process, i.e., notice and the right to a hear-
ing appropriate to the proposed deprivation at a meaningful time and place; instead, they are sim-
ply rules (albeit fundamental ones) of criminal law and practice .... If the defendant has had a
fair day in court and heard a reliable verdict, he has received all that due process guarantees him.")
(footnote and citations omitted).
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After several years of proposals, comments, and rule making, the United
States Department of Labor (the "Department" or "DOL") published new regu-
4latory criteria for the adjudication of federal black lung claims. With an
avowed goal to "level the playing field,"5 the Department expressed a prefer-
ence for a bright line test that allows adjudication officers to resolve issues of
eligibility based on the quality of the medical evidence developed by the parties
rather than merely the quantity of evidence that parties with superior financial
resources may be able to submit.6 The Department continues to believe that
adjudications under these revised regulations will result in fairer, more reliable
evaluations of black lung claims than the former system permitted.
Currently, in establishing their eligibility to benefits, claimants
must confront the vastly superior economic resources of their
adversaries: coal mine operators and their insurance carriers.
Often, these parties generate medical evidence in such volume
that it overwhelms the evidence supporting entitlement that
claimants can procure. The proposed changes limiting eviden-
tiary development attempt to make more equitable the adjudica-
tion of black lung claims and reduce the costs associated with
these cases. 8
4 The regulations published in 2000 traveled a long path before being proposed. In 1997, the
Secretary of Labor issued a notice of proposed revisions to the rules governing the adjudication of
claims under the Black Lung Benefits Act ("BLBA"). See Regulations Implementing the Federal
Coal Mine Health and Safety Act of 1969, as amended, 62 Fed. Reg. 3,338-3,435 (Jan. 22, 1997).
Interested parties had until March 24, 1997 to file comments and that deadline was twice ex-
tended, until August 21, 1997. The Secretary received approximately 200 comments and held two
public hearings on proposed rules, one in Charleston, West Virginia and a second in Washington,
D.C. The Secretary also consulted the National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health
("NIOSH"), the federal agency charged with researching occupational health. On October 8,
1999, the Secretary issued another notice, announcing revisions to certain proposed regulations.
See Regulations Implementing the Federal Coal Mine Health and Safety Act of 1969, as amended,
64 Fed. Reg. 54,966-55,072 (Oct. 8, 1999). Interested parties were given until January 6, 2000 to
file comments. After receiving more comments and testimony and consulting NIOSH and other
sources, the Secretary promulgated a final rule which was to go into effect on January 19, 2001.
See Regulations Implementing the Federal Coal Mine Health and Safety Act of 1969, as amended,
65 Fed. Reg. 79,920-80,107 (Dec. 20, 2000).
5 Regulations Implementing the Federal Coal Mine Health and Safety Act of 1969, as a-
mended, 62 Fed. Reg. at 3,372. The major changes proposed are procedural ones intended to level
the playing field between the individual claimant and the employer or insurer by placing limits
upon the amount of evidence which each party can submit.
6 Id. at 3,338.
7 See Regulations Implementing the Federal Coal Mine Health and Safety Act of 1969, as
amended, 65 Fed. Reg. at 79,992.
8 See Regulations Implementing the Federal Coal Mine Health and Safety Act of 1969, as
amended, 62 Fed Reg at 3,338.
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Operating from this premise, the Department promulgated limits on the amounts
and types of evidence parties can offer in the adjudication of black lung claims,9
the Department then defined a complete pulmonary evaluation to include a phy-
sician's report of physical examination and pertinent medical, occupational, and
social histories, a ventilatory study, chest X-ray, and arterial blood gas study.'°
Thus, a party's affirmative case can be wholly consumed in two complete pul-
monary evaluations." The regulations further broadened the regulatory defini-
tion of pneumoconiosis,12 which is recognized as a latent and progressive dis-
ease that may first become detectable only after the cessation of coal mine dust
exposure. 13 The regulations also changed the procedures for identifying coal
mine operators responsible for potential payment of benefits.' 4 Despite these
changes, some still claim that coal miners are systematically discouraged from
filing or pursuing claims brought under the Black Lung Benefits Act
9 In 20 C.F.R. § 725.414 (2000), the Department proposed that a party's affirmative case be
limited to chest X-ray interpretations, the results of two pulmonary function studies, two arterial
blood gas studies, and two medical reports. In rebuttal, each party will be able to submit one piece
of evidence analyzing each piece of evidence submitted by the opposing side. The Department
also provided the parties with the opportunity to rehabilitate the evidence submitted in connection
with their affirmative case that had been the subject of rebuttal. The parties could submit hospital
records and any other treatment records relating to the miner's respiratory or pulmonary condition
without regard to the evidentiary limitations elsewhere in § 725.414. See Regulations Implement-
ing the Federal Coal Mine Health and Safety Act of 1969, as amended, 65 Fed. Reg. at 79,990.
10 See id. at 80,046.
I Id. at 79,991.
12 20 C.F.R. § 718.201 provides the following definitions:
(1) Clinical pneumoconiosis. "Clinical pneumoconiosis" consists of those
diseases recognized by the medical community as pneumoconioses, i.e., the
conditions characterized by permanent deposition of substantial amounts of
particulate matters in the lungs and fibrotic reaction of the lung tissue to that
deposition caused by coal dust exposure in coal mine employment. This defi-
nition includes, but is not limited to, coal workers' pneumoconiosis, anthraco-
silicosis, anthracosis, and anthrosilicosis, massive pulmonary fibrosis, silicosis
or silicotuberculosis, arising out of coal mine employment.
(2) Legal pneumoconiosis. "Legal pneumoconiosis" includes any chronic
lung disease or impairment and its sequelae arising out of coal mine employ-
ment. This definition includes, but is not limited to, any chronic restrictive or
obstructive pulmonary disease arising out of coal mine employment.
(b) For purposes of this section, a disease "arising out of coal mine employ-
ment" includes any chronic pulmonary disease or respiratory or pulmonary
impairment significantly related to, or substantially aggravated by, dust expo-
sure in coal mine employment.
13 See Regulations Implementing the Federal Coal Mine Health and Safety Act of 1969, as
amended, 65 Fed. Reg. 79,920, 79,937 (Dec. 20, 2000).
14 See 20 C.F.R. §§ 725.407-725.412 (2000).
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("BLBA")."5 The main criticisms of the federal black lung expenditure system
"are that the claims process takes too long and helps too few. ' 6 In 1997, less
than 6% (419 of 6791) of claims for black lung benefits were granted. 17
This article seeks to highlight why the regulatory changes are not only
unfair, denying a full or meaningful hearing to the parties, but were also un-
needed, and in the final analysis are much ado about nothing. In spite of the
changes to the definition of coal workers' pneumoconiosis, the incidence of the
disease continues to fall. Regulatory changes that seek to "level the playing
field" by limiting the amount of evidence parties may offer, are a failed attempt
which actually bulldoze the playing field leaving mazes, sand traps, or trenches
for the unwary to negotiate. The draconian limits on evidence, which serve to
complicate what had been a relatively routine hearing process 18 before adminis-
trative law judges ("Al"), will now compel ALJs to identify' 9 different types
of affirmative2° or rebuttal2' evidence and to rule if "good cause,, 22 a term left
undefined, is shown to exceed the bright line limits proposed.23
If unrepresented coal miners or their survivors previously felt excluded
from the tent where black lung cases are decided, the new regulations and the
changes enacted will surely accentuate feelings of exclusion. Pro se litigants
will not likely feel the playing field has been leveled, but instead may feel they
are prohibited from even entering the pitch where the due process tent is raised.
15 See Brian C. Murchison, Due Process, Black Lung, and the Shaping of Administrative Jus-
tice, 54 ADMIN. L. REV. 1025 (2002).
16 Jessica L. Toler, "Dead Canaries: the Struggle of Appalachian Coal Miners to Get Black
Lung Benefits, 6 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 163, 177 (1998).
17 Id. at 178.
18 See Shedlock v. Bethlehem Mines Corp., 9 Black Lung Rep. 1-236 (1987); North American
Coal Co. v. Miller, 870 F.2d 948 (3d Cir. 1989). Hearings have not always been straightforward.
The twenty day rule (20 C.F.R. § 725.456) provided a source of great confusion and conflict until
the Benefits Review Board explained that when presented with surprise evidence a response was
proper.
19 The Office of Administrative Law Judges has published a form some ALJs require the
parties to complete prior to a hearing. U.S. Dep't of Labor, Black Lung Benefits Act Evidence
Summary Form, available at
http://www.oalj.dol.gov/public/blalung/refrnc/BLBAEvidenceSummaryForm-Instructions.
htm (last visited Mar. 12, 2004).
20 See 20 C.F.R. §§ 725.414(a)(2)(i)-(a)(3)(i) (2000).
21 See id.
22 Id. "Good cause" is an easier standard to meet than "extraordinary circumstances." Regula-
tions Implementing the Federal Coal Mine Health and Safety Act of 1969, as amended, 65 Fed.
Reg. 79,920, 79,990 (Dec. 20, 2000). The "good cause" standard has a stated purpose to accom-
modate the differing circumstances of individual cases and to ensure that all parties are given due
process. See id.
23 20 C.F.R. § 725.456(b)(1) (2000).
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Concerns of whether the playing field on which the big tent is raised is level will
be superfluous if no one applies to enter the tent.
I. BRIEF BACKGROUND OF THE PROGRAM
To understand the impact of the revised regulations, one must first un-
derstand where the federal black lung program has been. The federal black lung
program was asked to handle a large number of claims from coal mine workers
24
that had developed a chronic lung disease arising out of coal mine employ-
ment.25 The Black Lung Benefits Act, a federal workers' compensation pro-
gram, was conceived in response to political pressures to address the problems
caused by coal dust exposure, growing medical understanding of the effects of
long-term exposure to coal mine dust, and the mine disaster that occurred in
Farmington, West Virginia.26 The Federal Coal Mine Health and Safety Act of
196927 born of the disaster and legislative rush to respond, provided an initial
disability program that was flawed from its inception. While coal workers'
pneumoconiosis was described to affect a high percentage of American coal
miners, in 1969 10% of active and 20% of inactive coal miners showed X-ray
evidence of pneumoconiosis. 28 From these active and retired coal miners, over
one-half million federal black lung claims were filed. 29
In the first phase of the black lung program, coal mine operators were
excluded from participation. 30 The Department of Health, Education and Wel-
fare ("HEW"), through the Social Security Administration ("SSA"), was
charged with adjudicating claims arising out of coal workers' pneumoconiosis. 3I
24 In addition to coal miners, survivors of miners were also entitled to file claims.
25 See 30 U.S.C. § 902; 20 C.F.R. § 718.201 (2000).
26 On November 20, 1968, near Farmington, West Virginia, 78 miners died in an underground
coal mine explosion as a result of methane build-up. See PETER S. BARTH, THE TRAGEDY OF
BLACK LUNG: FEDERAL COMPENSATION FOR OCCUPATIONAL DISEASE 12 (1987).
27 The Federal Coal Mine Health and Safety Act of 1969 is roughly divided between the pro-
visions at 30 U.S.C. § 801 et. seq., which impose mandatory regulations to protect the health and
safety of coal miners, and the BLBA, 30 U.S.C. § 901 et. seq., which provides disability benefits
to those suffering from coal mine dust induced lung diseases.
28 Usery v. Turner Elkhom Mining Co., 428 U.S. 1, 6 n.] (1976). The Congressional finding
was less precise, stating "Congress finds and declares that there are a significant number of coal
miners living today who are totally disabled due to pneumoconiosis arising out of employment in
one or more of the Nation's coal mines; that there are a number of survivors of coal miners whose
deaths were due to this disease; and that few States provide benefits for death or disability due to
this disease to coal miners or their surviving dependents." 30 U.S.C. § 901(a) (2003).
29 Usery, 428 U.S. at 8 n.7.
30 J. Randolph Query, The Black Lung Benefits Act: An Operator's Perspective, 83 W. VA. L.
REV. 855, 856 (1981).
31 See 30 U.S.C. §§ 901-945; Title IV of Act, Pub. L. No. 91-173, 83 Stat. 742 (1969).
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If claims were approved, benefits were paid out of monies appropriated from
general revenues. 3pThese claims became known as "Part B" claims. SSA estab-
lished a system that awarded lifetime disability benefits to a miner, or their sur-
vivors, usually based on mere evidence of pneumoconiosis. 33 Claims filed on or
after January 1, 1973, 34 were to be filed by a claimant under the applicable state
workers' compensation law if that law was approved by the Secretary of Labor.
If no state law existed in the state in which the miner was employed, the claim
was to be filed with and processed by the Secretary of Labor and paid by the
miner's coal mine employer pursuant to criteria established by the Secretary of
Labor.35 If no coal mine employer could be identified due to insolvency, bank-
ruptcy, or similar events, the Secretary of Labor was authorized to pay approved
claims from federal funds.36 Claims filed on or after January 1, 1973 were to be
adjudicated pursuant to procedures incorporated 37 from the Longshoremen's and
Harbor Workers' Compensation Act,38 a federally administered and employer-
financed workers' compensation law for employees engaged in certain maritime
trades. The employer-financed portion of the program 39 was set to expire on
December 30, 1976.40 That expectation failed as claims are still being litigated
twenty-six years later.
The black lung program, in the guise of a disability program, was more
legitimately viewed as an entitlement or pension program for miners with more
than ten years of coal mine work. The BLBA was initially premised on the er-
roneous belief that only 50,000 coal miners, primarily consisting of individuals
no longer employed in the coal industry, were totally disabled by coal workers'
pneumoconiosis.4 1 Under the Part B claims, initially administered by HEW and
32 See 30 U.S.C. §§ 921-924 (1970); 30 U.S.C. § 923(b) (1976).
33 For example, 20 C.F.R. § 410.414 provided for a presumption of total disability due to coal
workers' pneumoconiosis with evidence of 15 years of coal mine employment and evidence of
pneumoconiosis or a totally disabling chronic respiratory or pulmonary impairment.
34 These claims are known as "Part C" claims. The January 1, 1973 filing date was eventually
moved back to June 30, 1973. 30 U.S.C. § 931 (1976).
35 See 30 U.S.C. §§ 931-936 (1970).
36 See id. § 934. These federal funds are known as the Black Lung Disability Trust Fund. 20
C.F.R. §§ 725.101(a)(8), 725.496-.497. It is an estimated $7.3 billion in debt. 2002 OWCP ANN.
REP. TO CONGRESS FY 2001, at 16.
37 See 30 U.S.C. § 932 (1970).
38 See 33 U.S.C. §§ 901-952 (1978).
39 See 30 U.S.C. § 932(e)(3) (1970).
40 Mark E. Solomons, A Critical Analysis of the Legislative History Surrounding the Black
Lung Interim Presumption and a Survey of its Unresolved Issues, 83 W. VA. L. REV. 860, 870
(1981).
41 Henry L. Stephens, Jr. & Alva A. Hollon, Jr., Closing the Evidentiary Gap: A Review of
Circuit Court Opinions Analyzing Federal Black Lung Presumptions of Entitlement, 83 W. VA. L.
REV. 793, 793 (1981).
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paid by the United States, 509,900 individuals had established eligibility of
556,200 claims filed.42
The initial criteria for determining if a miner was entitled to benefits
bore no semblance to medical reality and did not rely on any competent system
of assessment of pulmonary impairment. 43 Coal workers' pneumoconiosis 4 is
an unusual disease process. While coal workers' pneumoconiosis can cause
pulmonary impairment that is sometimes severe and disabling and can contrib-
ute to, if not cause, death, the radiographic evidence of coal workers' pneumo-
coniosis does not correlate well with the presence of pulmonary impairment. As
chest X-rays do not provide an estimate of lung function, experience has shown
that the correlation of chest X-ray findings with pulmonary function studies and
blood gas studies is quite poor.45
Simple pneumoconiosis, ordinarily identified by X-ray opacities of a
limited extent, is generally regarded by physicians as seldom indicative of sig-
nificant respiratory impairment.46 Simple coal workers' pneumoconiosis is a
radiological or pathological diagnosis; there are no associated symptoms or
signs. The most important clinical fact to remember about simple pneumoco-
niosis is that, if the patient is breathless, even in the presence of category 3 dis-
ease, another disease is responsible. In general, it can be stated that simple
pneumoconiosis per se has no important effect on spirometric measures of lung
function when prior dust exposure is taken into account.47 In medico-legal prac-
tice, it may be necessary to give an opinion, on the balance of the probabilities,
as to whether breathlessness and abnormal lung function in a patient has been
caused by exposure to coal mine dust. There is abundant evidence that reduc-
tions in forced expiratory volume in one reading ("FEV") and forced vital ca-
pacity ("FVC") occur in relation to dust exposure and this deficit may on occa-
sions be severe. However, most coal miners have smoked, and in such cases, the
relative contributions of the two harmful substances are a matter for individual
judgment, depending on the numbers of cigarettes smoked and an assessment of
42 Usery v. Turner Elkhorn Mining Co., 428 U.S. 1, 8 n.7 (1976).
43 For a system of assessment of pulmonary impairment, see Chapter 5, The Respiratory Sys-
tem, in AMERICAN MEDICAL ASSOCIATION, GUIDELINES TO THE EVALUATION OF PERMANENT
IMPAIRMENT (2001).
44 20 C.F.R. §§ 718.201(a)(l)-(a)(2) (2000). The legal definition of pneumoconiosis includes
a chronic dust disease of the lung arising out of coal mine employment, recognized as "clinical
pneumoconiosis," usually diagnosed by X-rays or histological tissue from autopsy or biopsy sam-
ples and "legal pneumoconiosis," including chronic obstructive pulmonary disease and industrial
bronchitis.
45 See Samuel J. Smith & Ford F. Newman, The Basics of Federal Black Lung Litigation, 83
W. VA. L. REV. 763, 779 (1981).
46 Usery, 428 U.S. at 7; N. Leroy Lapp, A Lawyer's Medical Guide to Black Lung Litigation,
83 W. VA. L. REV. 721, 736 (1981).
47 W.K.C. MORGAN & A. SEATON, OCCUPATIONAL LUNG DISEASES 391 (3rd ed. 1995).
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likely cumulative exposure to dust underground.48 In most instances, evidence
that the employer adhered to the national coal mine dust standards at the time of
employment should constitute a reasonable defense.49
Coal workers' pneumoconiosis is broadly divided between progressive
massive fibrosis5" and simple coal workers' pneumoconiosis. 51 While other dif-
ferences exist, the conditions are generally separated by the size of the lesions
seen on chest X-rays or in histological samples. Initially, only those miners
with progressive massive fibrosis, or complicated coal workers' pneumoconio-
sis, were to be compensated by the federal system. 52 Compensation for simple
pneumoconiosis (added by the conference committee) multiplied the potential
liability in black lung claims and the number of potential applicants.53 The plan
sought to phase out the federal system when state workers' compensation pro-
grams were approved to provide similar benefits. The hope proved unrealistic.
Today, there has yet to be a state program that has been approved to replace the
federal black lung program.
Revised criteria, known as the "interim presumption," were adopted in
the 1978 amendments to the BLBA, permitting many thousands of denied
claims to be reopened. 54 The Department of Labor, now charged to run the
black lung program, faced a huge backlog of claims. First, the interim presump-
tion encouraged many individuals with marginal claims to seek benefits. Sec-
ond, the backlog was compounded by the directive for Department of Labor to
review those claims denied by Social Security Administration.55
The new interim criteria only served to further extend the unrealistic
medical criteria and the artificially elevated award rate. Reopened claims using
the liberal interim medical criteria enjoyed a 46% approval rate at Office of
Workers' Compensation Programs.56 Miners with at least ten years of coal mine
employment were presumed totally disabled due to pneumoconiosis if the bene-
fits claimant had one of four types of evidence that showed either pneumoconio-
48 Id. at 391.
49 Id. at 392.
50 This is also referred to as complicated coal workers' pneumoconiosis. See Double B Min-
ing Inc. v. Blankenship, 177 F.3d 240, 243 (4th Cir. 1999).
51 For a more detailed discussion, see Lapp, supra note 46, at 729. See also Murchison, supra
note 15, at 1045.
52 See Murchison, supra note 15, at 1045.
53 Perhaps this explains the ten-fold increase in Part B claims eventually awarded. See supra
note 42 and accompanying text.
54 43 Fed. Reg. 17,721-70 (1978) (codified at 20 C.F.R. pt. 727.203).
55 20 C.F.R. pt. 727.
56 See Regulations Implementing the Federal Coal Mine Health and Safety Act of 1969, as
amended, 62 Fed. Reg. 3,338 (Jan. 22, 1997).
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sis or pulmonary impairment.57 A benefits claimant with either chest X-ray evi-
dence of pneumoconiosis, ventilatory studies showing abnormal results, arterial
blood gas studies showing abnormal results, or a physician's opinion indicating
that there existed a totally disabling pulmonary disease was entitled to the pre-
sumption of total disability due to pneumoconiosis. 58 Once invoked, the burden
of proof shifted to the party opposing entitlement, whether the Department of
Labor or a coal mine operator, to prove that no disability existed, that the im-
pairment did not arise out of coal mine employment, or that the claimant did not
suffer from pneumoconiosis5 9
The illusion of entitlement was exacerbated by the interim criteria of
Part 727. One method to establish the presumption of total disability due to
pneumoconiosis was with ventilatory tests. 60 Ventilatory function is dependent
on several factors including height, race, gender, and age. 61 The criteria con-
tained at § 727.203(a)(2) failed to consider the effect of age on ventilatory func-
tion.62 Medical reality is that ventilatory function naturally declines with age as
the lungs become less elastic.63 Failing to consider the aging effect afforded
older applicants the presumption of total disability due to pneumoconiosis,
premised on ventilatory function which may not have evidenced any pulmonary
impairment much less a disabling ventilatory impairment.64
After more than a decade of the flawed award system, casting the illu-
sion of a retirement rather than a disability program, the permanent criteria went
57 While the threshold to apply the interim presumption was not high, it was temporarily low-
ered in a decision from the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit that allowed the
presumption to be invoked with one piece of positive evidence. Stapleton v. Westmoreland Coal
Co., 785 F.2d 424 (4th Cir. 1986) (en banc). The Supreme Court later reversed that determination
in Mullins Coal Co. v. Director, OWCP, 484 U.S. 135 (1987), requiring all evidence to be ana-
lyzed before invoking the presumption under 20 C.F.R. §§ 727.203(a)(l)-(a)(4).
58 20 C.F.R. §§ 727.203(a)(l)-(a)(4) (2000).
59 Id. §§ 727.203(b)(l)-(b)(4).
60 Id. §§ 727.203(a)(2).
61 DANIEL E. BANKS & JOHN E. PARKER, OCCUPATIONAL LUNG DISEASE 21 (1998); American
Thoracic Society, Lung Function Testing: Selection of Reference Values and Interpretive Strate-
gies, 144 AM. REV. RESPIRATORY DISEASE 1202-08 (1991).
62 20 C.F.R. § 727.203(a)(2) (regulation only considered the effect of height, limiting the
changes to between 67 and 73 inches--lumping together any shorter than 67" with those 67" tall,
and anyone taller than 73" included with those 73" tall).
63 For a male whose height is 180 cm (about 71 inches), the predicted values for FVC and
FEVI decline from 5.05 liters to 4.21 liters for FVC and from 4.60 liters to 3.27 liters for FEVi.
R. J. Knudson, et al., The Maximal Expiratory Flow-Volume Curve: Normal Standards Variabil-
ity, and Effect ofAge, 113 AM. REV. RESPIRATORY DISEASE 587-600 (1976).
64 The Department of Labor's disability guidelines now reflect declines in both parameters, as
FVC for a 70.9 inch tall male declines from 3.12 to 2.53 and the FEVI declines from 2.68 to 1.99
from age 22 to age 70. 20 C.F.R. pt. 718, App. B.
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65 66into effect in 1982.65 These criteria, found at Part 718, were tied to realistic
medical criteria and scientific results. 67 The effect of age was considered in
68evaluating ventilatory function. The benefits claimant, as the proponent of the
requested order to award benefits, shouldered the burden of proof to establish
entitlement to benefits by a preponderance of the evidence. 69  Predictably,
award rates declined.7 °
The decline in awarded claims was multi-factorial. Not only were
claims harder to win because of the new medical criteria, but coal mine opera-
tors were defending an ever greater percentage of the claims filed.7' Whether
for political considerations, attorney competence, or fiscal limitations, coal mine
operators have been much more successful in defending claims before ALJs
than the Department.
Another reason the number of awarded claims declined is that the dust
standards put into place by the 1969 Federal Coal Mine Health and Safety Act
were beginning to reduce the amount of dust, and, in turn, the frequency and
severity of lung disease in coal miners.72 In a study of over 31,000 coal miners
at 1,439 mines in twenty-three states conducted between October 1995 and Sep-
tember 2002, NIOSH found 862 cases of simple coal workers' pneumoconiosis
(2.85%) and sixty-two cases of progressive massive fibrosis (0.25%). 73 The
65 See Director, OWCP v Greenwhich Collieries Co., 512 U.S. 267 (1984).
66 20 C.F.R. §§ 718.201-.204 (1982).
67 Congress required the Department of Labor, in conjunction with NIOSH, to develop perma-
nent "criteria for all appropriate medical tests ... which accurately reflect total disability in coal
miners . . ." 30 U.S.C. § 402 (f)(l)(D). For Part 718 claims, the appendix includes qualifying
tables for ventilatory function considering age, gender, and weight.
68 See Appendix B to 20 C.F.R. part 718 for ventilatory function tables.
69 See 20 C.F.R. §§ 718.201-.204 (1982).
70 The district level approval rate for claims filed after December 1981 was 5.0 percent as of
the end of the 1994 fiscal year. Claimants fared little better if they pursued their applications be-
yond the district level by requesting hearings before the Office of Administrative Law Judges; the
approval rate for such claims during the same period rose only to 7.6 percent. See 62 Fed. Reg.
3338 (Jan. 22, 1997).
71 Id.
72 NIOSH, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERV., CRITERIA FOR A RECOMMENDED
STANDARD, OCCUPATIONAL EXPOSURE TO RESPIRABLE COAL MINE DUST 42 (1995) (results from
successive cross-sectional surveys (or records) of these studies have shown general downward
trends in the prevalence rates of simple coal workers' pneumoconiosis among U.S. underground
coal miners). Of the 1,206 miners with exposure after 1969, 18 of 1,206 had X-rays indicating
simple coal workers' pneumoconiosis category 1 and 3 had category 2 or greater. Id. at 46. At
current exposure rates of 2mg/m3, estimates indicate that 7 of 1,000 workers will develop PMF
and 65 of 1,000 will develop simple coal workers' pneumoconiosis over a 40 year working life-
time. Id. at 57.
73 CTR. FOR DISEASE CONTROL, PNEUMOCONIOSIS PREVALENCE AMONG WORKING COAL
MINERS EXAMINED IN FEDERAL CHEST RADIOGRAPH SURVEILLANCE PROGRAMS IN THE UNITED
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social fabric of coal mining in the eastern United States had greatly changed.
No longer were individuals working thirty, thirty-five, or forty years as coal
miners. As a result of increased mechanization,74 the number of coal miners
needed to achieve the same or even greater production per mine was reduced.
Mining in anthracite or hard coal mines, where exposure was the most danger-
ous, had all but ended.75 Together with the change of focus in American coal
mining shifting from eastern underground mines to western strip mines,76 the
number of individuals at risk of developing coal workers' pneumoconiosis as a
result of underground coal mining dropped precipitously during the 1970's and
80's. Finally, the mythical belief that cigarette smoking somehow helped a
miner clear his lungs after working was finally dispelled, and with fewer smok-
ers, coal miners were generally less prone to develop chronic obstructive lung
disease due to cigarette smoking.
II. THE CHALLENGE TO THE REGULATIONS
The National Mining Association and other interested parties challenged
the revisions to the regulations, seeking declaratory and injunctive relief in the
United States District Court for the District of Columbia.77 The rules were chal-
lenged as: impermissibly retroactive; violating the BLBA or applicable provi-
sions of the Longshore and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act; impermissibly
shifting the burden of proof; running afoul of the rights to a full and fair hear-
ing; arbitrary, capricious, and an abuse of discretion; and violating the due proc-
ess guarantee of the Constitution because the rulemaking procedure was inade-
quate.78 The district court ultimately granted the Secretary of Labor's Motion for
Summary Judgment, upholding the regulations in every respect.79 The district
court upheld the regulations against various substantive challenges and also
found the rules were not impermissibly retroactive because they applied to only
newly filed claims or sought to clarify legal principles which were already in
affect and did not change the substantive standards of entitlement. 80  The Na-
STATES, 1996-2002, available at http://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/preview/mmwrhtml/mm5215a3.htm
(last visited Mar. 12, 2004).
74 Regulations Implementing the Federal Coal Mine Health and Safety Act of 1969, as
amended, 65 Fed. Reg. 79,920, 80,038 (Dec. 20, 2000).
75 Id. at 80,033.
76 Id. Low sulfur coal, found in the Power River Basin, is mined in large strip mines with
labor productivity approximately three times as high as eastern underground coal mines. Id. at
80,034.
77 See Nat'l Mining Ass'n v. Chao, 160 F. Supp. 2d 47 (D.D.C. 2001).
78 Nat'l Mining Ass'n v. Dep't of Labor, 292 F.3d 849, 855 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (per curiam).
79 Id. at 855.
80 See id.
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tional Mining Association sought review before the United States Court of Ap-
peals for the D.C. Circuit. The D.C. Circuit found it had jurisdiction to consider
the claim as the district court had jurisdiction to consider the challenges to the
regulations. 81 The regulations were found to be not impermissibly retroactive,
82
and the court rejected substantive challenges to the revised definition of pneu-
moconiosis,83 the change in condition rule,84 the treating physician rule, 85 the
hastening death rule,86 operator liability rules,87 the medical benefits rule,88 the
total disability rule,89 evidence limitation rules,90 dependency rules9' and the
attorney fees rule.92 The circuit court found that the BLBA's expanded defini-
tion of benefits, which included any expenses related to the medical authoriza-
tion, lacked specific statutory authorization necessary for the fee-shifting re-
quired and, therefore, was the one regulation which was invalid on its face.93
81 Id. at 858-59.
82 As the D.C. Circuit explained:
The general legal principles governing retroactivity are relatively easy to state,
although not as easy to apply. An agency may not promulgate retroactive rules
absent express congressional authority. A provision operates retroactively
when it "impairs rights a party possessed when he acted, increases a party's li-
ability for past conduct, or imposes new duties with respect to transactions al-
ready completed." In the administrative context, a rule is retroactive if it takes
away or impairs vested rights acquired under existing law or creates a new ob-
ligation, imposes a new duty, or attaches a new disability in respect to transac-
tions or considerations already past.
See id. at 859 (citations omitted). Furthermore, changes to the treating physician rule and the
definition of pneumoconiosis were found to codify judicial precedent and did not work a substan-
tive change in the law. Id. at 861-62.
83 See Nat'l Mining Ass'n v. Dep't of Labor, 292 F.3d 849, 869 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (per curiam)
(upholding 20 C.F.R. § 718.202 (2000)).
84 Id. at 870 (upholding 20 C.F.R. § 725.309 (2000)).
85 Id. (upholding 20 C.F.R. § 718.104(d) (2000)).
86 Id. at 871 (upholding 20 C.F.R. § 718.205(c)(5)).
87 Id. (upholding 20 C.F.R. §§ 725.407-725.408, 725.495 (2000)).
88 Id. at 873 (upholding 20 C.F.R. § 725.201(e) (2000)).
89 Id. (upholding 20 C.F.R. § 718.204 (2000)).
90 Id. at 874; 20 C.F.R. §§ 725.3 10(b), 725.414, 725.456, 725.457(d), and 725.458 (2000).
91 Id. (upholding 20 C.F.R. §§ 725.204, 725.213(c), 725.214, and 725.219(d) (2000)) (consid-
eration was declined because NMA failed to raise it during the notice-and-comment period).
92 Id. at 875 (upholding 20 C.F.R. § 725.366(b) (2000)).
93 Nat'l Mining Ass'n v. Dep't of Labor, 292 F.3d 849, 875 (D.C. Cir. 2002).
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The en face challenge to the regulation was unsuccessful. 94 However,
the application of the regulations to specific cases, or even an en face challenge,
may produce different judgments in different circuits. Although the D.C. Cir-
cuit rejected the introduction of unlimited evidence, the regulations were found
not to have inflexible limits on evidence.95 The revised rules did not set inflexi-
ble limits on evidence. 96 The rules gave ALJs discretion to hear additional evi-
dence for "good cause." 97 The court re-emphasized the need that the evidentiary
limitations allow, as a secretary explained, ALJs to focus their attention on the
"quality of the medical evidence in the record., 98
I. RESPONSIBLE OPERATOR IDENTIFICATION
The new regulations make substantial changes to the Department of La-
bor's policies and procedures for identifying and notifying coal mine operators'
believed responsible for liability in a federal black lung claim.99 Previous regu-
lations provided little guidance or mandatory deadlines for the identification of
the responsible operator. 100 These oversights led to prolonged, and probably
needless, litigation on several occasions. 10' While coal mine operators were
required to respond within thirty days after receipt of the notification, the identi-
fication of the responsible operator would occur "at any time during the process-
ing of the claim . . . after sufficient evidence has been made available to the
deputy commissioner.'10 2 While the District Director may initially identify one
94 Id.
95 Id. at 874.
96 Id.
97 Id. at 875.
98 Id. at 874 (quoting Regulations Implementing Changes to the Federal Coal Mine Health and
Safety Act of 1969, as amended, 64 Fed. Reg. 54,992, 54,994 (Oct. 8, 1999)).
99 20 C.F.R. §§ 725.407-.408 (2000).
100 See id. §§ 725.412-.413 (1978).
101 See, e.g., Island Creek Coal Co. v. Holdman, 202 F.3d 873 (6th Cir. 2000) (twenty years to
resolve a claim filed in 1980); Consolidation Coal Co. v. Borda, 171 F.3d 175 (4th Cir. 1999)
(twenty-one years to resolve a claim filed in 1978); Lane Hollow Coal Co. v. Dir., OWCP, 137
F.3d 799 (4th Cir. 1998) (twenty two years to resolve a claim filed in 1975); Venicassa v. Con-
solidation Coal Co., 137 F.3d 197 (3d Cir. 1998) (twelve years to resolve a claim filed in 1986).
In Venicassa, the court noted:
This case comes to us with a lengthy procedural history, due in large part to
the long delay by the OWCP in processing Venicassa's claim and to the ac-
knowledged error by the OWCP in designating the responsible coal mine op-
erator. Unfortunately, the OWCP's failure to designate the proper responsible
operator at the outset has exacerbated a problem all too familiar to us.
Id. at 198 n.2.
102 20 C.F.R. § 725.412 (a) (1978).
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or more operators as potentially liable for the payment of benefits, under the
revised regulations eventually one operator has to be selected before the claim is
referred to the Office of Administrative Law Judges.'0 3 Given the limitations on
evidence, 1°4 the identification of a single responsible operator was necessary to
prevent multiple evaluations from being conducted by several potential respon-
sible operators. 5
A coal mine operator is required to take two steps after receiving notifi-
cation of its identification as the potential responsible operator. First, within
thirty days of receipt of the operator notification, a response must be filed indi-
cating the intent to accept or contest identification as the potentially liable op-
erator.06 If the operator contests its identification, it must respond to five ques-
tions. 0 7 The second step required the potentially responsible operator to submit
documentary evidence in support of its position within ninety days of the date
on which it receives the operator notification. 10 8 Submission of any documentary
evidence is mandatory.') 9 No documentary evidence relevant to the issue of the
identification of the responsible operator may be admitted in any further pro-
ceedings unless it is submitted within the time limits set forth in the section. I10
Any testimony with regard to the liability of a potentially responsible operator
or designated responsible operator may not be offered unless the District Direc-
tor is notified of the name and current address of any potential witness. I
103 Id. § 725.410(a)(3) (2000) ("The schedule shall contain the district director's designation of
a responsible operator liable for payment of benefits.").
104 See Id. § 725.414 (2000).
105 20 C.F.R. § 725.414(a)(3)(i) permits "[t]he responsible operator designated pursuant to §
725.4 10" to "be entitled to obtain and submit" medical evidence.
106 Id. § 725.408(a)(1) (2000).
107 These questions are presented at 20 C.F.R. § 725.408(a)(2):
(i) That the named operator was an operator for any period after June 30,
1973;
(ii) That the operator employed the miner as a miner for a cumulative period
of not less than one year;
(iii) That the miner was exposed to coal mine dust while working for the op-
erator;
(iv) That the miner's employment with the operator included at least one
working day after December 31, 1969; and
(v) That the operator is capable of assuming liability for the payment of bene-
fits.
108 20 C.F.R. § 725.408(b)(1). The Department has been agreeable to extend this deadline for
good cause.
109 Id. § 725.408(b)(2).
Ito Id. This section effectively forces parties to produce relevant documentary evidence or
names of witnesses relevant to the responsible operator identification to allow OWCP to properly
identify the operator responsible.
I Id. § 725.414(c) (2000).
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The Department conceded that the revisions placed additional burdens
on coal mine operators not present under the prior regulations." 2 It observed
that under the previous regulations operators routinely filed "form" controver-
sions and waited until the case was referred to the Office of Administrative Law
Judges to develop their defenses." 3 The announced intention to change such
practice was in order to provide the District Director with sufficient information
to allow him to identify the responsible operator." 4 The regulations permit the
District Director to refer a case to the Office of Administrative Law Judges
("OALJ") with no more than one operator as a party to the claim-the operator
finally designated as the responsible operator." 5 Once referred to OALJ, the
consequences for any error in naming the responsible operator are placed on the
District Director." 16 If the District Director has not named the proper operator,
the Department is barred from seeking revision by naming alternative operators
and the case will have to be defended (and if awarded, paid) by the Black Lung
Trust Fund." 
7
Under the previous regulations it had become relatively clear that the
burden of identifying what operator was responsible rested with the District
Director.' 18 That has now been changed, dumping the initial responsibility on
the operator identified by the Department from the miner's employment history
112 Regulations Implementing the Federal Coal Mine Health and Safety Act of 1969, as
amended, 65 Fed. Reg. 79,920, 79,985 (Dec. 20, 2000). Interestingly enough, the revised regula-
tions seem to eliminate the need for a responsible operator to respond to a denial of benefits, as the
operator response provisions require only an operator's response to a finding of entitlement. 20
C.F.R. § 725.412 (2000). In revisions to the regulations concerning a proposed decision and or-
der, the Department has eliminated the need for both claimants and operators to ask for a hearing,
provided that such a request had already been made. See id. § 725.408 (2000).
113 Regulations Implementing the Federal Coal Mine Health and Safety Act of 1969, as
amended, 65 Fed. Reg. at 79,985. The Department first proposed limiting development of evi-
dence (absent extraordinary circumstances) to submission to the Office of Workers' Compensa-
tion Programs. Regulations Implementing the Federal Coal Mine Health and Safety Act of 1969,
as amended, 62 Fed. Reg. 3,338, 3,361-62 (Jan. 22, 1997). The Department eliminated the re-
quirement that documentary evidence obtained while the claim is pending before OWCP and
withheld until the claim is forwarded for a hearing could not be admitted unless extraordinary
circumstances were found to exist. 20 C.F.R. § 725.456(d) (1983); Standards for Determining
Coal Miner's Total Disability or Death Due to Pneumoconiosis; Claims for Benefits Under Part C
of Title IV of the Federal Mine Safety and Health Act, as amended, 48 Fed. Reg. 24,272, 24,292
(May 31, 1983). Obviously, this change fails to streamline the decision making process and now
works to reward those who hide potential evidence.
114 Regulations Implementing the Federal Coal Mine Health and Safety Act of 1969, as a-
mended, 62 Fed. Reg. at 3,362.
115 20 C.F.R. § 725.407 (d) (2000).
116 Id.
17 Regulations Implementing the Federal Coal Mine Health and Safety Act of 1969, as a-
mended, 62 Fed. Reg. at 3,362.
118 See Director, OWCP v. Trace Fork Coal Co., 67 F.3d 503, 507 (4th Cir. 1995).
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and after "an investigation" of the identity of the potentially responsible opera-
tor. 19 Under the prior regulations, when the District Director erred in naming
the responsible operator, miners or operators were able to convince various
courts that due process was not satisfied and that the parties had not been given
a meaningful hearing. 20 Now when an error occurs, the operator is required to
defend the claim.'
2
'
The regulations do alter the burden of proof by requiring the coal mine
operator--not the benefits claimant as the party who has filed the claim seeking
to have an award of benefits entered or the controlling administrative agency--to
conduct discovery of an applicant's coal mine employment. 22 Either through
interrogatories or depositions of coal miners, the named operator is asked to
determine if the employment history presented is correct and if the applicant's
last coal mining employment actually occurred with the operator identified.
Contrary to the comments, the changed regulation does interject additional
complexity, burdens and expenses in cases involving multiple operators andputs unrepresented claimants in potentially perilous situations.123 The reality of
defending operators under the new regulations is that depositions frequently
must be taken of benefits claimants, or their survivors, to determine if the coal
mine employment reported is correct, if the job duties were actually integral to
the production and extraction of coal (meeting the definition of "miner"), 24
whether their coal mine employment lasted for 125 working days or one calen-
dar year 25 with the named or other coal mine operator, and the potential loca-
119 20 C.F.R. § 725.407.
120 For some reason, it is typically the circuit courts of appeals that have addressed these griev-
ances in the past. See Venicassa v. Consolidation Coal Co., 137 F.3d 197 (3d Cir. 1998); Lane
Hollow Coal Co. v. Director, OWCP, 137 F.3d 799 (4th Cir. 1998). For a discussion of these
cases, see William S. Mattingly, Black Lung Update: The Evolution of the Current Regulations
and Proposed Revolution, 100 W.VA. L. REv. 601, 627-30 (1998).
121 20 C.F.R. § 725.407(d).
122 The D.C. Circuit disagreed. Nat'l Mining Ass'n v. Dep't. of Labor, 292 F.3d 849, 871-72
(D.C. Cir. 2002). Believing the revised regulations shifted only the burden of production, not the
burden of proof, which is prohibited under Director, OWCP v. Greenwich Collieries, 512 U.S.
267 (1994), the new regulations were characterized as requiring nothing more than operators to
submit evidence rebutting an assertion of liability. This holding may be changed when courts
examine actual cases and not abstract possibilities, when asked to determine if the revisions are
valid when applied.
123 The District Director denies any of these possibilities in the comments to the regulation.
Regulations Implementing the Federal Coal Mine Health and Safety Act of 1969, as amended, 65
Fed. Reg. 79,920, 79,985 (Dec. 20, 2000). In affirming the regulation the D.C. Circuit focused on
the comments to 20 C.F.R. § 725.495(c), rather than the effect of the regulation. Nat'l Mining
Ass'n, 292 F.3d at 872.
124 20 C.F.R. § 725.101(a)(19) (2000).
125 Id. § 725.101(a)(32).
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tion of prior employers, or their corporate officers. 126 The last inquiry is the
most difficult and the crux of most of the responsible operator litigation. A
prior operator is asked to determine if other coal mine operators still exist, or if
assets are present. Even when more recent employment with coal mine operators
can be identified and their corporate officers or corporate successors are identi-
fied, 127 the Director has discretion whether to name the more recent operator, its
successor, or the corporate officers, or opt to trace back in a miner's employ-
ment history and locate an operator that is compliant with the regulations, either
insured or self-insured, and is able to defend the claim or to be responsible for
payment of benefits should the claim be awarded.
28
Why a private coal mine operator rather than a government agency is in
a better position to obtain employment history and to make a determination as to
what operator should be responsible is unexplained. 29 Such a procedure does
provide administrative convenience of shifting at least the burden of production
and more probably the burden of proof on the coal mine operator. The assertion
that "clearly, however, operators and insurers are in a better position to ascertain
these facts than is the Department of Labor" is nonsense. 130
The revised regulations again fail to address the conflict of government
workers who labor for years in or around coal mines and are exposed to coal
mine dust and yet identify a prior coal mine operator as the entity responsible
for payment of black lung benefits. Under the doctrine of sovereign immunity,
federal coal mine inspectors employed by the Mine Safety and Health Admini-
stration ("MSHA") are precluded from filing federal black lung claims against
their federal employer.' 3' MSHA Inspectors, many of whom worked for a dec-
ade or more for the federal government after leaving a private coal mine em-
ployer and then retired, have been exposed to coal dust which has at least caused
part, if not all, of any lung disease suffered. It is illogical to allow these federal
employees a choice of remedies. If exposure to coal mine dust does lead to
chronic lung diseases, it is unfair, if not irresponsible, for the federal govern-
ment to circumvent potential liability for black lung claims by promoting a sys-
126 Id. § 725.495(a)(! )-(a)(2) (2000).
127 Id. § 725.492 (2000).
128 Lester v. Mack Coal Co., 21 Black Lung Rep. 1-126 (BRB 1999); Mitchem v. Bailey En-
ergy, Inc., 21 Black Lung Rep. 1-161 (BRB 1999).
129 The Department agrees that additional demands are placed on potentially liable operators,
but that these are not "unreasonable." Regulations Implementing the Federal Coal Mine Health
and Safety Act of 1969, as amended, 65 Fed. Reg. 79,920, 79,985 (Dec. 20, 2000).
130 Id. The comments also seem to run counter to the D.C. Circuit's reasoning for upholding the
regulation. Nat'l Mining Ass'n v. Dep't. of Labor, 292 F.3d 849, 872 (D.C. Cir. 2002).
131 Consolidation Coal Co. v. Borda, 171 F.3d 175, 180 (4th Cir. 1999). Although employees
can file Federal Employee Compensation Act claims, they are not under any requirement to ex-
haust remedies under this Act before seeking remedies under the Black Lung Benefits Act.
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tem that foists liability upon former coal mine employers in spite of years of
coal dust exposure while working for government agencies.
IV. TREATING PHYSICIAN
In a substantive change, it is now mandatory for the adjudication officer
to give consideration to the relationship between a miner and any treating physi-
cian whose report is admitted as evidence.' 32 The treating physician relation-
ship, according to the Department, may support a finding to accord "controlling
weight" to the treating physician's opinion.1 33 The revision of the treating phy-
132 The D.C. Circuit found this rule neither retroactive, Nat'l Mining Ass'n, 292 F.3d at 861,
nor mandatory because it does not relieve the benefits claimant of proving either pneumoconiosis
or the credibility of the doctor's opinion. Id. at 870. The rule may not be used to automatically
give controlling weight to a treating physician's opinion, for the court found the regulation to
permit reliance on the treating physician's testimony only where the physician's opinion is credi-
ble and consistent with record evidence. Id. In practice, the rule may be applied differently and be
invalid. Id.
133 The full text of 20 C.F.R. § 718.104(d) (2000) provides:
(d) Treating physician. In weighing the medical evidence of record relevant to
whether the miner suffers, or suffered, from pneumoconiosis, whether the
pneumoconiosis arose out of coal mine employment, and whether the miner is,
or was, totally disabled by pneumoconiosis or died due to pneumoconiosis,
the adjudication officer must give consideration to the relationship between
the miner and any treating physician whose report is admitted into the record.
Specifically, the adjudication officer shall take into consideration the follow-
ing factors in weighing the opinion of the miner's treating physician:
(1) Nature of relationship. The opinion of a physician who has treated the
miner for respiratory or pulmonary conditions is entitled to more weight than
a physician who has treated the miner for non-respiratory conditions;
(2) Duration of relationship. The length of the treatment relationship demon-
strates whether the physician has observed the miner long enough to obtain a
superior understanding of his or her condition;
(3) Frequency of treatment. The frequency of physician-patient visits demon-
strates whether the physician has observed the miner often enough to obtain a
superior understanding of his or her condition; and
(4) Extent of treatment. The types of testing and examinations conducted dur-
ing the treatment relationship demonstrate whether the physician has obtained
superior and relevant information concerning the miner's condition.
(5) In the absence of contrary probative evidence, the adjudication officer
shall accept the statement of a physician with regard to the factors listed in
paragraphs (d)(I) through (4) of this section. In appropriate cases, the relation-
ship between the miner and his treating physician may constitute substantial
evidence in support of the adjudication officer's decision to give that physi-
cian's opinion controlling weight, provided that the weight given to the opin-
ion of a miner's treating physician shall also be based on the credibility of the
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sician regulation reveals a softening of the initial 1997 proposal by the Depart-
ment of Labor. 134  Originally, the "treating physician rule" began with the
proposition that a "treating physician may be entitled to controlling weight" by
the adjudication officer. 35 When this rule was revised, the relationship between
the treating physician and the benefits claimant became the mandatory focal
point for the adjudicator's analysis.' 36  Nonetheless, only in "appropriate
cases"'137 may the relationship provide support for the decision to give greater
weight to the treating physician's analysis. 38 Even though "controlling weight"
is given to the "treating physician," and both terms are left undefined, 39 the
physician's opinion in light of its reasoning and documentation, other relevant
evidence and the record as a whole.
134 The full text of the initial treating physician proposal 62 Fed. Reg. 3,375 provided:
(d) Treating physician. The medical opinion of a miner's treating physician
may be entitled to controlling weight in determining whether the miner is, or
was, totally disabled by pneumoconiosis or died due to pneumoconiosis. The
adjudication officer shall take into consideration the following factors in
weighing the opinion of a treating physician:
(1) Nature of relationship. The opinion of a physician who has treated the
miner for respiratory or pulmonary conditions is entitled to more weight than
a physician who has treated the miner for non-respiratory conditions;
(2) Duration of relationship. The length of the treatment relationship demon-
strates whether the physician has observed the miner long enough to obtain a
superior understanding of his or her condition;
(3) Frequency of treatment. The frequency of physician-patient visits demon-
strates whether the physician has observed the miner often enough to obtain a
superior understanding of his or her condition; and
(4) Extent of treatment. The types of testing and examinations conducted dur-
ing the treatment relationship demonstrate whether the physician has obtained
superior and relevant information concerning the miner's condition.
(5) Whether controlling weight is given to the opinion of a miner's treating
physician shall also be based on the credibility of the physician's opinion in
light of its reasoning and documentation, other relevant evidence and the re-
cord as a whole.
135 Regulations Implementing the Federal Coal Mine Health and Safety Act of 1969, as
amended, 62 Fed. Reg. 3,338, 3,375 (proposed Jan. 22, 1997) (to be codified at 20 C.F.R. §
718.104(d)).
136 Section 718.104(d) instructs that the adjudication officer "must give" consideration to the
relationship between the miner and a treating physician.
137 What constitutes appropriate cases is left undefined.
138 20 C.F.R. § 718.104(d)(5) (2000).
139 "Controlling weight" and "treating physician"--both key components--are left undefined
without any clear meaning.
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treating physician must provide a reasoned and documented opinion before his
conclusions can be accorded controlling weight. 140 Status cannot cure deficien-
cies in testing and explanation that would be fatal flaws in reports from a non-
treating physician. 14' The adjudicator was cautioned to consider the treating
physician's opinion on its own merits in the context of the remainder of the re-
cords to determine whether deference to the treating physician is appropriate.
42
The "treating physician rule" as formulated fails to define what constitutes a
treating physician. Whether such a treating relationship is established on one
occasion or over a course of years goes unaddressed and will be left for practi-
tioners and ALJs to iron out.
The revisions leave open the possibility, to the exclusion of other rele-
vant evidence, that a treating physician's opinion may be given controlling
weight when well reasoned. Thus, no longer may the preponderance of the evi-
dence be needed to establish entitlement to benefits. 43 The fear with such a rule
is that instead of mandating production of all relevant evidence,' 44 a fact finder
may now automatically defer to the treating physician's opinion based on the
nature, duration, frequency, and extent of the physician's treatment. If quality
of medical evidence is really one of the overriding reasons for the regulatory
revisions, how a physician-patient relationship indicates "quality" medical evi-
dence is both unexplained and illogical.
140 Id.
141 See id. § 718.202(a)(4) (requiring both sound medical judgment and reasoned medical opin-
ion).
142 See Regulations Implementing the Federal Coal Mine Health and Safety Act of 1969, as
amended, 62 Fed. Reg. 3,338, 3,342 (proposed Jan. 22, 1997) (to be codified at 20 C.F.R. §
718.104(d)). Paragraph (d)(5) underscores the requirement that, status aside, the treating physi-
cian must provide a reasoned and documented opinion before his conclusions can be accorded
controlling weight. Status cannot cure deficiencies in testing and explanation which would be
fatal flaws in reports from a non-treating physician. Accordingly, this provision requires the adju-
dicator to consider the treating physician's opinion on its own merits and in the context of the
remainder of the record to determine whether deference to the treating physician is appropriate. It
is based on this understanding that the D.C. Circuit found the regulation valid. Nat'l Mining
Ass'n v. Dep't. of Labor, 292 F.3d 849, 870-71 (D.C. Cir. 2002).
143 By regulatory fiat, the Department has tried to accomplish what it failed to do before the
United States Supreme Court's decision in Director, OWCP v. Greenwich Collieries, 512 U.S.
267 (1994). In Greenwich Colleries, the true doubt rule, which eventually shifts the burden of
persuasion to the party opposing the benefits claim when evidence is evenly balanced, was held
invalid. Advocates for claimants asked the Department to resurrect the rule, but the Department
declined to implement a rule to resolve all reasonable doubt in favor of the benefits claimant.
Regulations Implementing the Federal Coal Mine Health and Safety Act of 1969, as amended, 65
Fed. Reg. 79,920, 79,926 (Dec. 20, 2000). Rather, the Department "has provided assistance to
claimants in other ways" including, for example, the treating physician rule. Id.
144 30 U.S.C. § 923(b) requires consideration of all relevant evidence. To the extent it is not
otherwise defined by ALJs or regulations, relevant evidence is "[e]vidence having any tendency to
make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more
probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence." FED. R. EVID. 401.
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Frequency and extent of treatment are relevant factors in evaluating any
physician's assessment and diagnosis. Yet, both the Department and operators
are arbitrarily limited in showing additional medical studies or evidence to ex-
amining physicians, risking the exclusion of part or perhaps the entirety of their
opinions.
45
Some claim confusion has marred the black lung claims process and
evaluation of the physician opinion evidence, particularly the weighing of the
opinion of a miner's treating physician against the opinions of other physicians
of record.146 Some claim that in most cases the miner relies heavily on the pro-
bative strength of his treating physician's diagnosis of disease, disability, and
disability causation.1
47
The role of the treating physician in the litigation of federal black lung
claims is fraught with controversy and confusion. Some circuit courts indicate
that the treating physician deserves special deference based on status. 48 The
treating physician has been described as knowing his patient as a human being
rather than as a claim number, and as a doctor who develops opinions in an at-
tempt to treat the patient rather than providing "an opinion for hire'
' 49
145 See 20 C.F.R. § 725.457(d). Some may envision 20 C.F.R. § 725.457(d) as representing a
"fruit of the poisonous tree" scenario for physicians that view "inadmissible" evidence as requir-
ing exclusion of the physician's opinion. This section provides: "A physician whose testimony is
permitted under this section may testify as to any other medical evidence of record, but shall not
be permitted to testify as to any medical evidence relevant to the miner's condition that is not
admissible." Id. The "fruit of the poisonous tree" doctrine deals with coerced confessions of an
accused. See generally Gary D. Spivey, Annotation, "Fruit of the Poisonous Tree" Doctrine:
Exclusionary Evidence Derived From Information Gained in Illegal Search, 43 A.L.R.3d 385
(2003). Evidence inappropriately obtained from an accused is to be excluded from the state's
case. See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961). Different considerations are made when the testi-
mony is not a putative defendant. See United States v. Ceccolini, 435 U.S. 268 (1978). Such an
exclusion of evidence, especially from an expert, runs counter to established practice in other
areas. See Peabody Coal Co. v. Director, OWCP, 165 F.3d 1126, 1128 (7th Cir. 1999).
146 See Murchison supra note 15, at 1088.
147 Id. After clerking for an ALJ and practicing in this area since 1985, it has been my experi-
ence that it is more infrequently the case that a treating physician's opinion is not presented as
evidence. The new regulation encourages a change in this long standing practice.
148 See Tussey v. Island Creek Coal Co., 982 F.2d 1036, 1042 (6th Cir. 1985) ("It is clearly
established that opinions of treating physicians are entitled to greater weight than those of non-
treating physicians."). No support was given for this "well established principle" but for two
cases: one not involving a treating physician, Sexton v. Director, OWCP, 752 F.2d 213, 215-16
(6th Cir. 1985), and the other an SSA disability claim, Collins v. Sec'y of HHS, 734 F.2d 1177,
1179-80 (6th Cir. 1984). Neither case was precedent for the proposition suggested. In Lango v.
Director, OWCP, 104 F.3d 573, 577 (3d Cir. 1997), the Third Circuit suggested that the ALJ may
permissibly require the treating physician to provide more than a conclusory statement before
finding that pneumoconiosis contributed to the miner's death. The new rule would require more
than a conclusory statement.
149 Grizzle v. Pickands Mathur & Co., 994 F.2d 1093, 1101 (4th Cir. 1993) (Hall, J., dissent-
ing).
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The Sixth Circuit has helped to put an end to any uncertainty concerning
the application of the treating physician rule.150  Despite a certain degree of
lingering confusion among the courts of appeals, it has become overwhelmingly
evident that the testimony of the "treating physician" receives no additional
weight.' 5' Noting that the Supreme Court recently reversed a Ninth Circuit de-
cision that afforded deference to treating physicians in the context of ERISA-
related disability determinations,'52 the Sixth Circuit observed that the unani-
mous Court "disapproved of the 'treating physician rule' with language that
criticizes the principle itself rather than its operation in the ERISA context."15 3
The DOL's regulations were viewed as consistent with the Court's rejection of
routine deference given to a treating physician, 54 as the DOL intended the rule
to force a careful and thorough assessment of the treating physician relation-
ship. 55 The rule seems clear as explained by the Sixth Circuit:
A simple principle is evident: in black lung litigation, the opin-
ions of treating physicians get the deference they deserve based
on their power to persuade. For instance, a highly qualified
treating physician who has lengthy experience with a miner
may deserve tremendous deference, whereas a treating physi-
cian without the right pulmonary certifications should have his
opinions appropriately discounted. The case law and applicable
regulatory scheme make clear that Al~s must evaluate treating
physicians just as they consider other experts. 56
In the Sixth and Seventh Circuits, the status of a physician as the treat-
ing physician is irrelevant in determining the relative weight to be accorded to a
medical opinion. 57 There is no basis for preferring the opinion of a "treating
physician" over a physician who evaluates a benefits claimant or reviews clini-
cal testing and serial treatment records of a benefits claimant. The treating phy-
sician rule was first proposed by the Department of Labor in 1997. 58 In the
1SO Eastover Mining Co. v. Williams, 338 F.3d 501 (6th Cir. 2003).
151 Id. at 509.'
152 Black & Decker Disability Plan v. Nord, 538 U.S. 822 (2003) (reversing Nord v. Black &
Decker Disability Plan, 296 F.3d 823 (9th Cir. 2002).
153 Eastover, 338 F.3d at 509.
154 Black & Decker Disability Plan, 538 U.S. at 832-33.
155 Eastover, 338 F.3d at 512.
156 Id. at 513 (citations omitted).
157 See id. at 509; Peabody Coal Co. v. McCandless, 255 F.3d 465 (7th Cir. 2001).
158 See Regulations Implementing the Federal Coal Mine Health and Safety Act of 1969, as
amended, 62 Fed. Reg. 3,338, 3,339 (Jan. 22, 1997).
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republished rule in 1999, DOL specifically requested the views of the medical
community to aid in their crafting of the "treating physician rule."'
159
Although the medical community did not support the rule, the drafters
ignored their advice and counsel. The American College of Chest Physicians
commented:
We agree that some opinions should be considered to carry
more weight than others. Opinions that carry the most weight
should be based on the competence of the physicians and the
competence of the opinion that was written. Everything else
(duration of the relationship between the doctor and the miner
or the extent of treatment) is irrelevant. This is an important er-
ror in the proposed regulations which must be corrected in this
amended version of the black lung regulations. 1
60
The occupational lung disorder committee of the American College of
Occupation and Environmental Medicine also opposed the preference:
The treating physician, however, has an inherent conflict of in-
terest in determining whether the coal mine or patient is totally
disabled from pneumoconiosis due to coal mine dust exposure.
By supporting their patient's claim for black lung benefits, the
treating physician is helping to guarantee future reimbursement
for medical services rendered by the treating physician for al-
most any type of pulmonary disorder in ensuing years based on
the proposed amendments to the Black Lung Benefits Act. This
represents a direct financial conflict of interests. The eligibility
determination for black lung benefits should be done as an in-
dependent medical evaluation by physicians with extensive ex-
perience and training in occupational pulmonary disease. The
treating physician's medical records and supportive documenta-
tion should be available for review by the independent medical
examiners and taken under consideration in rendering their
opinions. The treating physician's opinion can be counted as a
pulmonary evaluation but should not be given equal and not
controlling weight in determining whether a coal miner is to-
tally disabled or died due to pneumoconiosis. 16' In fact some
data would suggest treating physicians might even use decep-
159 See Regulations Implementing the Federal Coal Mine Health and Safety Act of 1969, as
amended, 64 Fed. Reg. 54,966, 54,976 (Oct 8, 1999).
160 Comments on the Proposed Rule, Exhibit 5-165, Regulations Implementing the Federal
Coal Mine Health and Safety Act of 1969, as amended (Aug. 20, 1997) (on file with author).
161 Comments on the Proposed Rule, Exhibit 5-166, Regulations Implementing the Federal
Coal Mine Health and Safety Act of 1969, as amended (Aug. 20, 1997) (on file with author).
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tion to assist patients in obtaining third party benefits, making a
treating physician's opinion inherently less reliable.1
62
The purpose in assigning a treating physician extra or controlling weight
presumes the treating physician will generally support the result that the coal
miner desires, an award of benefits.' 6 The treating physician rule cannot be-
come another method of creating a presumption of entitlement that was present
under 727 cases or a thinly veiled attempt to rely on the discredited "true doubt"
principle.
64
The preference for the relationship of a treating physician seems con-
trary to other portions of the regulations that specifically direct the adjudicator
to look at the credentials of physicians offering opinions.165 Even if a board
certified radiologist and NIOSH certified B-reader 66 indicate that posterior-
anterior chest X-rays or CT scans are negative for coal workers' pneumoconio-
sis, the provisions of § 718.104(d) suggest the absurd proposition that a general
medical practitioner's diagnosis of coal workers' pneumoconiosis--premised on
seeing a miner frequently for several years and treating complaints of a pulmo-
nary disease--may now be given controlling weight. This might occur even if
the general medical practitioner believed there is X-ray evidence of coal work-
ers' pneumoconiosis, while the other evidence proved such a conclusion errant.
There exists no rational basis for such a balancing of conflicting evidence.
Surely, the quality of the evidence would not be taken into consideration in such
a weighing based on status of the examiner. Such a fear may be unfounded,
however, as the D.C. Circuit seems to only allow the regulation to pass muster if
reliance on the treating physician is premised on a credible medical opinion con-
sistent with record evidence.
The "treating physician rule" cannot be read to require controlling or
determinative weight to be given a treating physician. Rather, the AU must
consider enumerated factors when evaluating any physician's opinion, irrespec-
162 See V. Freeman, et. al., Lying for Patients: Physician Deception of Third-Party Payers, 159
ARCHIVES OF ENVTL. MED. 2263, 2263 (1999); K. Folley, Physician Advocacy and Doctor Decep-
tion, 48 FED. LAWYER 25, 25 (2001); Peabody Coal Co., 255 F.3d at 469 (noting that "[t]reating
physicians often succumb to the temptation to accommodate their patients (and their survivors) at
the expense of third parties such as insurers, which implies attaching a discount rather than a
preference to their views").
163 Or as the comments acknowledge, treating physicians provide "assistance to claimants." See
Regulations Implementing the Federal Coal Mine Health and Safety Act of 1969, as amended, 65
Fed. Reg. 79,920, 79,926 (Dec. 20, 2000).
164 See Dir., OWCP v. Greenwich Collieries, 512 U.S. 267 (1994).
165 See 20 C.F.R. § 718.202(a)(1) ("in evaluating such X-ray reports consideration shall be
given to the radiological qualifications of the physicians interpreting such X-rays").
166 B-readers are physicians that have demonstrated proficiency in evaluating X-rays for pneu-
moconiosis and other diseases by passing a specially designed proficiency examination. See 20
C.F.R.§ 718.202(a)(i)(ii)(E).
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tive of whether that physician is labeled as the "treating" physician. When qual-
ity of the evidence is examined, ALJs have understood their task is to weigh the
quality, not just the quantity of the evidence. 67 In the end, the treating physi-
cian rule adds an additional hoop through which ALJs must pass but should not
change the outcome of the case if quality of the opinion is the guiding consid-
eration.
V. LIMITATIONS ON THE QUANTITY OF EVIDENCE
The Department has instituted bright line limitations 68 on the quantity
and types of documentary medical evidence that parties may submit in a federal
black lung claim. In proposing this limitation, the Department acknowledged
the concerns expressed by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit.
69
The Department believed that the amount of allowable evidence needed to be
limited.170 The Department's cited reasons for the limitations included its asser-
tion that the limitations represented a reasonable means of focusing the fact
finder's attention on the quality of the medical evidence in the record before
him.' 7' The Department first proposed limiting development of evidence, absent
extraordinary circumstances, to submission to the Office of Workers' Compen-
sation Programs. 172 In this belief is the implicit assumption that ALJs were un-
able to control the size of the record or the nature of the evidence to be submit-
ted. This impression, perched on anecdotal evidence, 73 ignores the AU's
167 See, e.g., Mullins Coal Co. v. Dir., OWCP, 484 U.S. 135, 149 n.23 (1987).
168 See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
169 Regulations Implementing the Federal Coal Mine Health and Safety Act of 1969, as a-
mended, 65 Fed. Reg. 79,920, 79,989 (Dec. 20, 2000). In Woodward v. Director, OWCP, 991
F.2d 314, 321 n.2 (6th Cir. 1993), the Sixth Circuit, without any basis, noted that the superior
financial resources of some parties allow the development of a greater quantity of evidence, which
"skewed and directly undermined" the "truth seeking function of the administrative process." Id.
at 321.
170 Such a belief evidences displeasure from an inferior bureaucratic level with the results
reached by the policy determinations of a superior level. Here an inferior level of the Department
of Labor, primarily the Office of Workers' Compensation Programs, sought to institute a two
pronged attack to limit Al~s' ability to consider evidence by: (I) preventing ALJs from receiving
any evidence; and (2) trying to prevent changes in entitlement determinations when claims were
referred to an AU.
171 See Regulations Implementing the Federal Coal Mine Health and Safety Act of 1969, as
amended, 64 Fed. Reg. 54,966, 54,994 (Oct. 8, 1999); see also Regulations Implementing the
Federal Coal Mine Health and Safety Act of 1969, as amended, 62 Fed Reg. 3,338, 3,356-57 (Jan.
22, 1997).
172 See 62 Fed. Reg. at 3,361-62.
173 In one case, a mine operator's lawyer submitted eighty-nine separate X-ray readings from
fourteen different experts. Nat'l Mining Ass'n. v. Dep't of Labor, 292 F.3d 849, 874 (D.C. Cir.
2002). I was the mine operator's lawyer who submitted those 89 X-rays. The experts, either radi-
ologists or pulmonary specialists, read the available series of chest X-rays to respond to the claim
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power to exclude repetitive or cumulative evidence.174 The Administrative Pro-
cedure Act ("APA")1 75 grants ALJs broad discretion to exclude excessive evi-
dence which lacks significant probative value, and by implication, to limit ex-
aminations, evaluations, and consultations by experts that are unduly repetitious
and thus lacking in probative value. 176
A second purported reason for the limitations was to prevent a miner
from undergoing more than five pulmonary evaluations for purposes of assess-
ing entitlement to benefits. 77 This could indeed be a reasonable reason to limit
examinations. In light of the strenuous nature of pulmonary testing, including
both pulmonary function and arterial blood gas tests, no claimant should have to
undergo repeated evaluations simply to create a numerically superior eviden-
tiary record for one side or the other. Instead, five evaluations should be suffi-
cient in most cases to allow the fact-finder to assess the miner's pulmonary con-
dition. In the Department's view, additional evaluations would have only mar-
ginal utility. 
178
The Department acknowledges that due process requires a flexible pro-
cedure as the particular situation demands.1 79 Further, coal mine operators have
a monetary interest in each claim involving an average payout of $175,000 for
the lifetime of claimant. 180 Claimants also have a financial interest in the bene-
that a deceased miner had clinical or medical pneumoconiosis. Despite the evidence, the AU
awarded benefits. The anecdotal statements of opposing counsel in this case, hardly support the
notion that excessive evidence was presented that the ALJ found either of no relevance or no
value.
174 See Underwood v. Elkay Mining Co., 105 F.3d 946, 950 (4th Cir. 1997).
175 30 U.S.C. § 932 et seq. Hearings conducted under the Black Lung Benefits Act are gov-
erned by the Administrative Procedure Act. 30 U.S.C. § 932(a) (incorporating 33 U.S.C. §
919(d), in turn incorporating 5 U.S.C. § 554); Underwood, 105 F.3d at 949.
176 Underwood, 105 F.3d at 950.
177 See Regulations Implementing the Federal Coal Mine Health and Safety Act of 1969, as
amended, 64 Fed. Reg. 54,966, 54,994 (Oct. 8, 1999) (one complete pulmonary evaluation pro-
vided by OWCP, 20 C.F.R. § 723.406, two possible examinations in the miner's, 20 C.F.R. §
725.414(a)(2)(i), and the operator's, 20 C.F.R. § 725.414(a)(3)(i)).
178 See Regulations Implementing the Federal Coal Mine Health and Safety Act of 1969, as
amended, 64 Fed. Reg. at 54,994. The Department's own comments seem to speak with a forked
tongue. It is the frequency, duration, and extent of a treating physician's testing, see 20 C.F.R.
§ 718.104(d), which may cause controlling weight to be appropriately accorded to that medical
opinion. Why an examining physician, who has reviewed studies of ventilation, blood gas trans-
fer, diffusion, or radiological techniques that may be in excess of the limitations, and based on that
review are afforded a better quality and understanding of a miner's longitudinal medical presenta-
tion, must be excluded from consideration, see 20 C.F.R. §§ 724.414(a)(2)(i), 725.414(a)(3)(i),
and 725.457, is wholly arbitrary, irrational, and conflicting with the premises underlying other
portions of the regulatory revisions.
179 Regulations Implementing the Federal Coal Mine Health and Safety Act of 1969, as
amended, 64 Fed. Reg. at 54,994.
180 Id. Awards can be substantially greater if a spouse or disabled dependent child is involved
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fits of an award and should be given the "opportunity to substantiate their claims
without being overwhelmed by the superior economic resources of their adver-
saries." 18 ' The Department noted that as a general rule there was not "significant
risk" 182 of erroneous deprivation of private interests if there are similar limita-
tions on the quantity of evidence each party may develop. An additional safe-
guard was added to allow an AU to receive evidence in excess of limitations
upon a showing of good cause. 83
Based on this rationale, the Department has limited a claimant or a re-
sponsible operator to two X-ray interpretations, two medical reports, two venti-
latory studies, and two arterial blood gas studies.1 84 Strangely enough, the De-
partment opted to set no limitations on "other medical evidence."'' 85 According
to the regulations, "other medical evidence" includes the "results of any medi-
cally acceptable test or procedure reported by a physician and not addressed in
this subpart, which tends to demonstrate the presence or the absence of pneumo-
coniosis .... [and] may be submitted in connection with a claim and shall be
given appropriate consideration."'' 86  The party submitting the other medical
tests bears the burden to demonstrate that the test or procedure is relevant to
establishing or refuting a claimant's entitlement to benefits. 87 In addition to the
who gets benefits for his or her lifetime. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 725.209-.219.
181 Regulations Implementing the Federal Coal Mine Health and Safety Act of 1969, as
amended, 64 Fed. Reg. at 54,994.
182 Id. The significance of the risk is in the eye of the responsible party. The Department's
final rule revising the Black Lung Regulations will increase premiums paid by coal mine indus-
tries to insure. The premium increase would result in additional annual costs to the industry rang-
ing from $32,220,000 to $88,320,000 with a point estimate of $57,560,000. See Regulations
Implementing the Federal Coal Mine Health and Safety Act of 1969, as amended, 65 Fed. Reg.
79,920, 80,030, 80,045 (Dec. 20, 2000).
183 Regulations Implementing the Federal Coal Mine Health and Safety Act of 1969, as
amended, 64 Fed. Reg. 54,966, 54,994 (Oct. 8, 1999). Medical evidence in excess of the limita-
tions contained in § 725.414 shall not be admitted. 20 C.F.R. § 725.456 (b)(1) (2000). A showing
of "good cause" is necessary only in the event that a party seeks to convince the ALI that the
particular facts of the case justify the submission of additional medical evidence, either in the
form of a documentary report or testimony. The Department believes that in the majority of cases,
the quantity of medical evidence permitted by the regulations, even in the absence of a good cause
showing, will provide a more than adequate evidentiary basis for an ALI to determine the claim-
ant's eligibility for benefits. 65 Fed. Reg. at 80,000.
184 20 C.F.R. § 725.414(a) (2000).
185 Id. § 718.107 (2000).
186 Id.
187 Id. Thus, the re-readings of CT scans of the chest, lung volume studies, or carbon dioxide
diffusion capacity studies are not included in the limitation on evidence. This again evidences the
arbitrary formulation of the limitations, as these studies, frequently found in claims, can be useful
in establishing or refuting a claimant's entitlement to benefits. The comments emphasize that
§ 718.107 evidence is to be received to permit any party to offer evidence relevant to resolving
entitlement to benefits. See Regulations Implementing the Federal Coal Mine Health and Safety
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two medical reports offered by the claimant and the responsible operator, a fifth
medical report, ventilatory study, X-ray interpretation, and pulmonary evalua-
tion is included in every record as the Department is charged with administering
a complete pulmonary evaluation to each coal miner.
88
While arguing that this would be an equal presentation of evidence, the
coal mine operators are now playing on an uphill field with a two to three ratio
in every case and possibly a treating physician's opinion. To those defending
coal mine operators, the big tent of due process looks much smaller and less
inviting. The miner selects the physician to perform the OWCP evaluation.
89
Claimants frequently select physicians they believe will be sympathetic to their
interests. 90
Why two X-ray interpretations, two pulmonary function studies, two ar-
terial blood gas studies, or two medical reports are deemed sufficient to present
each side's case is unknown. The "two reports and you are out rule" seems to be
a carry over from the bright line rule proposed for claims examiners in 1997.191
While the D.C. Circuit found the regulatory limitations passed an en face chal-
lenge, 1 92 the limitations may not pass muster when applied. An AU must con-
sider additional evidence and rule if the evidence is relevant to determine if
good cause is established. The failure to consider the relevance of this evidence
is per se error; otherwise, the limitations are transformed into absolute bounda-
ries that cannot be expanded.
A party is allowed to submit two chest X-ray interpretations in its re-
spective affirmative case. 193 However, the regulations are unclear as to whether
or not the physician who performs the pulmonary evaluation should also inter-
pret the chest X-ray to offer a "complete pulmonary evaluation." The Depart-
ment' s definition of a complete pulmonary evaluation includes a B-reading of a
Act of 1969, as amended, 65 Fed. Reg. at 79,936.
188 A complete pulmonary examination includes a report of physical examination, a pulmonary
function study, a chest roentgenogram, and, unless medically contraindicated, a blood gas study.
20 C.F.R. § 725.406(a) (2000).
189 The miner selects an approved physician from a list of all authorized physicians in the state
of the miner's residence and all states contiguous to the state of the miner's residence. See id.
Why the Department believed miners living in West Virginia needed to be able to travel as far
west as Toledo, Ohio, as far east as Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, as far north as Erie, Pennsylvania,
or as far south as Norfolk, Virginia to be evaluated is unknown.
190 For example, many in West Virginia select Dr. D.L. Rasmussen to perform the OWCP
examination. A huge backlog of claims resulted when Dr. Rasmussen, the predominate OWCP
examiner in southern West Virginia, was unable to perform pulmonary evaluations for several
months in 2002.
'91 Regulations Implementing the Federal Coal Mine Health and Safety Act of 1969, as
amended, 62 Fed Reg. 3,338, 3,375 (Jan. 22, 1997).
192 Nat'l Mining Ass'n v. Dep't of Labor, 292 F.3d 849, 874 (D.C. Cir. 2002).
193 20 C.F.R. §§ 725.414(a)(2)(i), (a)(3)(i) (2000).
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chest X-ray. 194 Thus, an examining physician who does not interpret a chest X-
ray, but defers to the interpretation of a board-certified radiologist/B-reader may
not have offered "a complete pulmonary evaluation." The weight accorded to
that opinion may be disputed. While two arterial blood gas studies are guaran-
teed for each affirmative case, 95 frequently exercise studies include one or two
resting arterial blood gas studies and one to three exercise arterial blood gas
studies. If a total of four or five arterial blood gas studies accompany a physi-
cian's assessment, it may be suggested that the bright line limitations have been
exceeded so as to bar the report of the physician or other arterial blood gas stud-
ies.196 Of course, such an argument is folly if quality of evidence is of para-
mount concern. Despite the contrary holding by the D.C. Circuit, the eviden-
tiary limitations may be invalid as applied.
While the Department selected two as the number of ventilatory studies,
arterial blood gas studies, medical reports, or X-rays to be submitted by a party
in its affirmative case, only one "autopsy report" was deemed sufficient. 197 The
regulatory criteria provide no explanation for this inconsistency. Again, when
applied in a particular case and not in a hypothetical situation, the regulatory
bright line limitation appears to be wholly arbitrary and capricious. As the prac-
tice has evidenced in black lung cases, no competent pathologist is willing to
interpret the meaning of the tissue findings on autopsy or biopsy samples when
medical records chronicling a patient's clinical presentation are available.
Whether using these records will transform that autopsy or biopsy report into a
"medical report" is unknown.
Depositions may only be conducted of witnesses who have offered
medical reports, or provided in lieu of a medical report. 198 However, the regula-
tions suggest that a party may offer the testimony of no more than two physi-
cians. 199  Additional depositions are not allowed unless the AU finds good
cause under § 725.456(b)(1). 20 0 The right to confront and cross-examine is fun-
194 Id. §§ 718.104(a)(5), 725.406(a) (2000).
195 See supra note 188.
196 See 20 C.F.R. § 725.414(a)(2)(i) (requiring that any "chest X-ray interpretations, pulmonary
function test results, blood gas studies, autopsy report, biopsy report, and physicians' opinions that
appear in a medical report must each be admissible" as part of a parties' case or as a record of
hospitalization or treatment for respiratory or pulmonary disease under § 725.414(a)(4)).
197 20 C.F.R. §§ 725.414(a)(2)(ii) and 725.414(a)(3)(ii) are interpreted to allow each side to
submit one report in rebuttal of an autopsy or biopsy report offered by the opposing side. See
Regulations Implementing the Federal Coal Mine Health and Safety Act of 1969, as amended, 65
Fed. Reg. 79,920, 79,991 (Dec. 20, 2000).
198 20 C.F.R. §§ 725.457(a), 725.458 (2000).
199 A physician must offer a medical report. 20 C.F.R. § 725.457(c)(2) (2000). A party may
offer the testimony of no more than two physicians under the provisions of this section unless the
adjudication officer finds good cause. Id. § 725.414(c).
200 id.
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damental. The use of consultative medical reports in the context of Social Secu-
rity disability claims has been found reliable if the claimant had the opportunity
to subpoena physicians and cross-examine the reporting physicians.2°1 In black
lung claims, the provisions of the APA specifically provide for cross-
202
examination. Limiting a party to depose only two of the five examining phy-
sicians would eviscerate the right of cross-examination for a full and true disclo-
sure of the facts. The Department does not agree that the rights of the parties to
fully cross-examine adverse evidence is denied.0 3 To support this conclusion,
the Department acknowledges the right of the parties' ability to cross-examine
the authors of written medical reports. 204 The Department's regulations purport-
edly provide all parties with a full and fair opportunity to conduct cross-
examination:
If the author of a report testifies at the hearing, the opposing
party may clearly avail itself of the opportunity to conduct live
cross-examination. In cases where the documentary medical
evidence stands on its own, the opposing party may question the
author of the report under the conditions determined by the ad-
ministrative law judge.205
The regulations leave open the question of whether a party can ever de-
pose a radiologist who had the opportunity to interpret either chest X-rays or CT
scans. Depositions are authorized for physicians who offer medical reports or in
lieu of a medical report.20 6 Medical reports "shall consist of a physician's writ-
ten assessment of the miner's respiratory or pulmonary condition., 20 7 A physi-
cian's written assessment of a single objective test, such as a chest X-ray, is "not
be considered a medical report. 20 8 By definition, a radiologist's report of a
single chest X-ray is not a medical report and the radiologist is "not allowed" to
be deposed. 209 It is unknown if the opinion of a radiologist who reads X-rays
201 Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 404-05 (1971).
202 5 U.S.C. § 556(d) (2000) provides, in pertinent part, that "[a] party is entitled to present his
case or defense by oral or documentary evidence, to submit rebuttal evidence, and to conduct such
cross-examination as may be required for a full and true disclosure of the facts."
203 See Regulations Implementing the Federal Coal Mine Health and Safety Act of 1969, as
amended, 65 Fed. Reg. 79,920, 80,000 (Dec. 20, 2000).
204 Id.
205 See id.; 20 C.F.R. § 725.459(b) (2000) (providing for fees for the cross-examination of
those witnesses a proponent does not intend to call to appear at a hearing or deposition).
206 20 C.F.R. § 725.457 (2000).
207 Id. § 725.414(a)(1) (2000).
208 Id.
209 Id. § 725.457(c).
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and a CT scan becomes a "medical report" (interpreting other medical evidence)
under § 718.107, which would allow a deposition. Again, the regulations that
purport to simplify the process through quality evidence only muck up the pic-
ture.
Frequently, the interpretation of a single chest X-ray is not useful to a
radiologist or pulmonary specialist when looking for progression and changes in
an individual's chest. A large mass on a single chest X-ray could be progressive
massive fibrosis, complicated coal workers' pneumoconiosis,210 or a non-
occupationally induced lung cancer or tuberculosis. Without serial interpreta-
tions of X-rays ranging over several years, certain lung diseases cannot be de-
termined. The two X-rays limitation in an affirmative case imposes an arbitrary
limit that may prevent a party from presenting a "full and true disclosure of the
facts."' t ' In essence, the limitations require that a party ask a physician to ren-
der differential diagnoses including all possible diseases that the abnormality
might represent, or risk the exclusion of an opinion that considers too much evi-
dence. Such a differential diagnosis does not aid the fact finder to complete the
truth-seeking function and determination. If the Department is truly concerned
about truth-seeking--a concern that the Sixth Circuit echoed in Woodward--
bright line limitations make little sense when the limitations work to exclude
better medical analysis of a miner's condition. While the bright line limitation
may serve a purpose for the non-lawyer administrative staff at OWCP, the limits
are not useful for ALJs trained as attorneys. The bright line limits were first
devised to serve the OWCP's receipt of all medical evidence, and envisioned no
new medical evidence being received by ALJs absent extraordinary circum-
212stances. As is the practice under Rule 703 of the Federal Rules of Evidence,
an expert witness may base an opinion on materials that "need not be admissi-
ble, let alone admitted, in evidence, provided that they are the sort of thing on
which a reasonable expert draws in formulating a professional opinion. 213
The limitations on evidence seem to be disingenuous when compared to
the standards by which the adjudicators are now required to weigh the opinion
of the treating physician. The frequency with which the treating physician sees
a patient, the duration of the relationship, the types of testing, and the extent of
treatment or examinations conducted determine whether a treating physician has
obtained "superior and relevant information" concerning the miner's condi-
tion.2 14 A treating physician may be able to interpret serial X-rays or ventilatory
and blood gas studies conducted over the course of the last 20 years. These
210 The presence of complicated coal workers' pneumoconiosis entitles a claimant to benefits.
Id. § 718.304(a) (2000).
211 See supra note 202.
212 See Regulations Implementing the Federal Coal Mine Health and Safety Act of 1969, as
amended, 65 Fed. Reg. 79,920, 79,989-90 (Dec. 20, 2000).
213 Peabody Coal Co. v. Dir.., OWCP, 165 F.3d 1126, 1128 (7th Cir. 1999); FED. R. EVID. 703.
214 20 C.F.R. § 718.104(d) (2000).
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would far exceed the two tests or X-rays the other parties are limited to submit.
Such treatment records will be received into the record if offered by either
party.215 However, if these records are not received into the record, or not of-
fered but merely reviewed by an expert, the regulations prohibit consideration of
that expert's opinion.216 One ALJ rejected a recent pulmonary evaluation au-
thored by a physician because that physician reviewed evidence which was not
received into the record.1 7 That evidence consisted of ventilatory studies and
arterial blood gas studies conducted during hospitalizations or in association
with prior state occupational pneumoconiosis claims.21 8 Again, such an action
defies the avowed goal of offering better quality evidence.
The regulations fail to provide any limitations on other types of medical
testing such as the more sensitive radiological tool of CT scans.2' It is permis-
sible for parties to offer multiple interpretations of CT scans (under other evi-
dence at § 718.107) yet be limited to only two interpretations of inferior chest
X-rays. Again, such limitations do not serve the goal of proving the highest
quality information to a fact finder, but instead serve only to limit and skew
evidence and present more questions because of the artificial limitations on evi-
dence. The more reasonable limitation that could have been imposed was on
examinations, leaving it up to the AU to determine if other evidence was rele-
vant or cumulative.
It is axiomatic that the standard of care in medicine requires that a phy-
sician consider as many facts as pertinent to understanding a patient's condition.
Serial studies of ventilatory function, chest X-rays, or other types of testing are
relevant to be considered when evaluating a patient's condition. For example, in
asthmatics, serial ventilatory tests with and without bronchodilator medications
help to diagnose and then manage the asthma. Similarly, experts evaluating a
coal miner's condition need to be able to consider these studies without regard
to whether the treatment records are, or are not, part of the administrative record
presented to an ALT for consideration.
These evidentiary limitation regulations were born out of a bureaucratic
power grab, premised on the notion that no medical evidence should be consid-
ered except evidence submitted to the District Director.220 The Office of Ad-
ministrative Law Judges would have been prohibited from receiving any addi-
tional evidence to be considered absent extraordinary circumstances. 221 The
215 Id. § 725.414(a)(4) (2000).
216 Id. §§ 725.414, 725.456 (2000).
217 Hamborsky v. Consolidation Coal Co., No. 2002-BLA-5153 (BRB Apr. 23, 2003).
218 Id.
219 20 C.F.R. § 718.107 (2000).
220 See Regulations Implementing the Federal Coal Mine Health and Safety Act of 1969, as
amended, 62 Fed. Reg. 3,338, 3,361-62 (Jan. 22, 1997).
221 Id.
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Department eventually retreated from the position that parties submit all of their
documentary medical evidence to the District Director.222 In addition, the De-
partment has offered the good cause exception, theoretically extending the
bright line rule which its regulations mandate for receipt of evidence before the
District Director.223 The Department's suggestion that the claimant should have
to undergo no more than five pulmonary evaluations seems to have a reasonable
basis. However, the Department has given no reasonable explanation why phy-
sicians could not review medical records, X-rays, or CT scans known to exist
and render consultative reports.
VI. CONCLUSION
An Administrative Law Judge recently made the following observa-
tions:
After over 25 years of hearing "black lung" cases, this is my fi-
nal decision. I have enjoyed participating in the evolution of
the law and particularly in the interaction with the attorneys that
have appeared before me.
The program has been less than successful. Following are sev-
eral obvious observations and suggestions on how the adjudica-
tion aspects may be improved.
1. More reliable evidence must be forthcoming. The Depart-
ment of Labor should be given the wherewithal to obtain credi-
ble, objective, expert medical evidence. Additionally and/or al-
ternatively ALJs should be given and exercise the authority
similar to U.S. District Judges to order specific additional medi-
cal evidence, particularly with respect to the presence or ab-
sence of clinical pneumoconiosis.
2. The Benefits Review Board should refrain from their pro-
pensity to remand cases based on flimsy reasons. An objective
overseer might contend that the sole or primary reason for some
of these remands is to keep their attorneys busy and/or the sys-
tem churning. Requirement for basically de novo review by the
ALJ in such cases is often an unnecessary and unwanted bur-
den.
222 See Regulations Implementing the Federal Coal Mine Health and Safety Act of 1969, as
amended, 65 Fed. Reg. 79,920, 79,999 (Dec. 20, 2000).
223 Id.
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3. The so-called "progressive" nature of pneumoconiosis has
resulted in systematic abuse of the modification procedure,
most often on behalf of Claimants. At a minimum, a limit on
the times a Claimant may file should be enacted.
4. Employers' financial capability far exceeds Claimant's re-
sulting in a lack of qualified attorneys who are willing to ag-
gressively pursue meritorious claims. Unequal results exist be-
tween those cases defended by an Employer and those by the
Trust Fund. A way should be found to reward Claimant's attor-
neys who pursue meritorious claims.
5. Claims that have been previously decided should not, ex-
cept under rare circumstances, be resurrected by a change in
regulations. Courts and the Board should refrain from deciding
old cases on new principles in the law.
In summary, the amount of claims paid exceed far, far beyond
anyone's imagination when the legislation was passed in 1969.
(The law was intended to expire in 1981) Nevertheless, the bu-
reaucracy as well as Employers' attorneys have probably bene-
fited more than Claimants. Claims paid are based not so much
on merit, but the ability to marshal evidence and the where-
withal of the adversary. Examining physicians have become
polarized thereby losing credibility.
On the other hand, it is interesting to contemplate as to what
outcomes would have resulted had the law not been passed, and,
almost certainly, a class action been instigated, by plaintiff mat-
ters.224
Several of this experienced AL's observations have been addressed in
the proposed revisions to the regulations. All affected parties seem to agree that
the program has been less than successful. Benefits claimants want more claims
awarded, and coal mine operators find the costs of the program to be excessive.
The need for more reliable evidence was one of the reasons the Department
sought revisions.225 The opening of the door for ALJs to develop evidence was
specifically rejected as neither the APA nor the LHWCA gives an AU the right
to demand the submission of more evidence for their decision making.2 26 When
224 Riffle v. Carbon Fuel Co., No. 1989-BLA-01959 (BRB Dec. 19, 2002).
225 One of the other goals was to change the law in various circuits where the Department had
lost cases.
226 Regulations Implementing the Federal Coal Mine Health and Safety Act of 1969, as a-
mended, 65 Fed. Reg. 79,920, 80,000 (Dec. 20, 2000).
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unpersuaded by the evidence, the AU must resolve the issue against the party
that bears the burden of proof.227 The scope of review for the Benefits Review
Board is always a source of controversy. Yet, more often than not the AU fails
to explain why evidence is, or is not persuasive, as is required by the BLBA.2 8
The progressive nature of pneumoconiosis, now a part of the regulatory defini-
tion, 229 is sure to be a focus of controversy in future claims. The Department has
not defined pneumoconiosis as always or even typically latent and progressive,
for such a definition could not have been supported by the administrative re-
cord.23° Indeed, the Department has acknowledged that the most common forms
of pneumoconiosis are not latent23' and that progressive pneumoconiosis is rare
by all accounts.232 Of course, the notion of progressivity as a basis for modifica-
tion could be stopped if the timeliness provisions of the regulations are ever
really enforced.233
In a profile of beneficiaries for Part B claims, a total of approximately
67,000 beneficiaries were receiving total monthly case benefits of $39 million
from the Social Security Administration in Part B claims. 34 Part C claims have
over 54,000 miners or widows receiving benefits, and of those over 13% are
responsible operator cases.235 With each miner's claim valued at approximately
$175,000 per claim, the coal industry shoulders over $1 billion of liability in
black lung benefits. On top of this existing debt, DOL estimates that the revised
regulations would cost the coal industry between $33 and $88 million in addi-
tional insurance CoStS. 23 6  With current studies showing that less than 1,000
227 Id.
228 Inadequate analysis is not restricted to black lung cases. Sufficient analysis, omissions, or
findings that amount to a striking non sequitur plague appellate courts in reviewing other areas of
law. See Niam v. Ashcroft, 354 F.3d 652 (7th Cir. 2004).
229 "Pneumoconiosis is recognized as a latent and progressive disease." 20 C.F.R. § 718.201(c)
(2003).
230 Nat'l Mining Ass'n v. Dep't of Labor, 292 F.3d 849, 869 (D.C. Cir. 2002).
231 Id. at 863.
232 Id.
233 20 C.F.R. § 725.308 (2000) provides three years after a medical determination of total dis-
ability due to pneumoconiosis was communicated to a miner for a claim to be filed. Hope that
ALJs will enforce the three year rule was given new life by the Sixth Circuit in Tennessee Con-
solidated Coal Co. v. Kirk, 264 F.3d 602 (6th Cir. 2001). See also Furgerson v. Jericol Mining
Inc., 22 Black Lung Rep. 1-216 (BRB 2002) (en banc); Abshire v. D & L Coal Co., 21 Black
Lung Rep. 1-202 (BRB 2002) (en banc).
234 OWCP ANN. REP. TO CONGRESS FY 2001, available at
http://www.dol.gov/esa/aboutesa/OWCPAnnual-Report-to-Congress FY 2001.pdf (last visited
Feb. 17, 2004).
235 Id. at 25.
236 See Regulations Implementing the Federal Coal Mine Health and Safety Act of 1969, as
amended, 65 Fed. Reg. 79,920, 80,030 (Dec. 20, 2000).
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working miners out of over 31,000 evaluated have chest X-ray evidence of
pneumoconiosis, the suggestion that the low-award rates are flawed cannot be
supported.237 As radiographic evidence of pneumoconiosis does not equate to
the existence of disability, much less significant or "total disability," fewer, not
more, awards are justifiable. While the evidentiary limits will fuel action under
the big top for the immediate future, the need for this program is ending. The
Congressional concerns that gave birth to the program have borne the fruit of
improved health and safety for American coal miners.
237 See supra notes 67-74.
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